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The plaintiffs/appellants, The Travel Company and William 
Hatton, pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, submit the following Appellants1 Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j ). This is an appeal from the Order and 
Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. That 
Order and Final Judgment granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the two-year corporate survival 
statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989)? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the two-year 
corporate survival statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989), and 
not the six-year statute of limitations on written contracts of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2), applies to the plaintiffs' claims? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that the two-year 
corporate survival statute is absolute and not subject to extension 
under the circumstances of this case? 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that William Hatton 
has no individual claim under the terms of the Agreement and 
Promissory Note? 
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5. Is William Hatton entitled to pursue an individual claim 
under the terms of the Agreement and Promissory Note because the 
assets of the Travel Company passed to him on dissolution of the 
corporation? 
6. Is William Hatton entitled to pursue his individual claim 
as a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement and Promissory Note? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All issues on appeal involve legal conclusions by the trial 
court. These legal conclusions will be given no deference by the 
Utah Supreme Court and will be reviewed for legal correctness. Alf 
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is 
determinative of certain issues on appeal. Other issues are 
governed by case law authority. The language of these designated 
statutes is set out in the Addendum to this Appellants' Brief 
pursuant to Rule 24(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989); 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2); 
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a claim for breach of contract and an accounting 
regarding a purchase agreement and promissory note executed between 
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the plaintiffs and the defendants. In 1979, William Hatton and 
Wanda Hatton ("Hattons11) founded a travel service business known as 
The Travel Company. In December of 1984, Morris Travel and its 
guarantors began negotiations to purchase the stock and assets of 
The Travel Company from the Hattons. In April of 1985, an 
agreement was reached between the parties for the purchase by 
Morris Travel of the assets of The Travel Company. The terms of 
the sale were incorporated into an agreement entitled Agreement for 
the Purchase and Sale of Assets ("Purchase Agreement") dated April 
15, 1985. A copy of that Purchase Agreement is included in the 
Addendum to this Appellants1 Brief. This is an action for breach 
of that Purchase Agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Jury Demand in this 
case on February 18, 1993. (R.2-56). The action was filed by the 
Travel Company and William Hatton "individually and on behalf of 
The Travel Company." (R.2). 
On or about March 17, 1993, the defendants filed their Motion 
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (R.63-65), 
alleging that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 (1989), the 
plaintiffs could not assert claims on behalf of a corporation which 
was dissolved more than five years before this action was filed. 
That motion was supported by a memorandum of law. (R.66-107). 
The plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary 
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Judgment. The plaintiffs argued that (1) The Travel Company had 
complied with the applicable six-year statute of limitations of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2); (2) that the two-year corporate 
survival statute of limitations is not absolute and that 
circumstances of this case dictate that the two-year limitation be 
extended; (3) that even if the two-year statute applies, William 
Hattonfs individual claims are not precluded, based on his 
contractual privity with the defendants, his status as a 
shareholder of The Travel Company, and his status as a third-party 
beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement. (R.118-142). 
After hearing, the Trial Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, concluding that (1) all obligations 
allegedly owed by Morris Travel were corporate claims of The Travel 
Company and that William Hatton had no individual claim concerning 
those obligations; (2) William Hattonfs individual claims as a 
shareholder, whether asserted by Hatton or The Travel Company, are 
governed by the two-year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 
and that those claims are barred as untimely; (3) and that the 
Courtf s conclusions regarding the corporate nature of the 
obligation is supported by the initial complaint filed by The 
Travel Company, the documents filed in the Hattonfs divorce 
proceedings, and the substantive allegations of the plaintiffs' 
complaint in this case. (R.254-256). 
This appeal followed. (R.257-258). 
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C. Statement of Facts 
1. The Travel Company is a former Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business located in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. William Hatton is an individual and former President of the 
Travel Company. (R. 2) 
2. On April 15, 1985, the Travel Company, Morris Travel 
Express Corporation, then known as Morris Travel Corporation 
("Morris Travel"); and William and Wanda Hatton entered into an 
Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of the Travel Companyfs assets. 
("Purchase Agreement"). (R. 3-4; 118). 
3. To William Hatton1s knowledge, the Agreement and Exhibits 
were drafted by lawyers for Morris Travel. Only minor changes, 
additions, or alterations were made by the Hattons to that 
document. (R. 143-144). 
4. The Travel Company, Morris Travel, and William and Wanda 
Hatton were specifically designated as separate parties to the 
Purchase Agreement (The Travel Company designated "Seller", Morris 
Travel designated "Buyer", and William and Wanda Hatton designated 
"Hattons"). (R. 119, 133). 
5. The Purchase Agreement was signed seperately by the 
Travel Company by its president; Morris Travel by its president; 
and William Hatton and Wanda Hatton as individuals. (R. 119, 133). 
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6. Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, Morris 
Travel paid The Travel Company a specified amount at the time of 
closing and executed a Promissory Note for the balance. (R. 4, 
177-178)• 
7. The Promissory Note was specifically incorporated as 
part of the Purchase Agreement executed between The Travel Company, 
Morris Travel, and the Hattons on April 15, 1985. (R. 137). 
8. Kay H. Burgon, Randall A. Hunt, Richard Frendt and Mark 
G. Slack executed Guaranty Agreements in conjunction with the 
execution of the Promissory Note to guaranty payment of the Note. 
(R. 9, 15-17, 140). 
9. In paragraph 1 of the Purchase Agreement, the plaintiffs 
transferred to Morris Travel the following: 
(a) The name "The Travel Company" and all 
variations and derivations thereof and all goodwill 
associated therewith, as such names are now or formally 
have been used by Seller in connection with Seller ?s 
business operations in the State of Utah or any other 
SLuLc. • • • 
(h) Any other assets, including without limitation 
and other leases or contracts used by Seller in 
connection with its business . . . 
(R. 176-177). 
10. Paragraph 19(b) of the Agreement provides as follows: 
All of the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of, and Shall be enforceable by 
the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal 
representatives and assigns of Buyer, Seller, and the 
Hattons. (Emphasis added). 
(R. 203). 
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11. Under the terms of a Hatton divorce agreement, William 
Hatton has been given authority to pursue this claim against Morris 
Travel for both himself and Wanda Hatton. (R. 136). 
12. On October 1, 1987, the Department of Commerce for the 
State of Utah involuntarily dissolved The Travel Company for 
failure to file an annual report. (R. 74). 
13. In February of 1988, Morris made payment to the 
plaintiffs to cover installments due under the Promissory Note on 
April 30, 1987; July 31; 1987; October 31, 1987 and January 31, 
1988. (R. 10). The next installment was due on April 30, 1988. 
(R. 137). 
14. After the April 1988 installment was not made, on or 
about June 30, 1988, The Travel Company, through prior counsel, 
filed a lawsuit in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah to collect moneys owed under the Purchase Agreement 
and Promissory Note. (R. 75-96). 
15. During negotiations, counsel for Morris Travel required 
that payments made under the Promissory Note be approved by William 
Hatton and Wanda Hatton. (R. 141-142). 
16. On August 3, 1988, The Travel Company, through prior 
counsel, filed a Notice of Dismissal without prejudice of that 
action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. 106-107). 
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17. That dismissal was not filed in response to any payment 
made to the Travel Company or the Hattons by Morris Travel, and was 
not intended as a resolution of this claim. It was filed because 
of Hatton?s prior counsel's conflict of interest, having 
represented one of the Hattons in divorce proceedings. (R. 143-
144). 
18. On February 18, 1993, this action was brought by The 
Travel Company and William Hatton against Morris Travel and the 
individual guarantors to collect moneys owed under the Agreement 
and Promissory Note. (R. 2-56). 
19. After the filing of this action, the defendants moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims are 
barred by the two-year corporate survival statute of Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-100. (R. 63-65) 
20. The plaintiffs responded to the defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment arguing that the six-year statute of limitations 
of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2), not the two-year corporate survival 
statute, applies to these claims of breach of a written contract; 
that even if the two-year corporate survival statute applies, that 
limitation is not absolute and may be extended under the 
circumstances of this case; that the two-year corporate survival 
statute bars only The Travel Company claims, and not the individual 
claims of William Hatton, which claims he is entitled to pursue 
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either as an individual party, or a third-party beneficiary, to the 
Agreement and Promissory Note. (R. 118-142). 
21. After hearing and oral argument, the trial court granted 
the defendants the Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the 
plaintiffs1 claims were barred by Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989). 
(R. 254-256). 
22. This appeal followed. (R. 257-258). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in concluding that the two-year 
corporate dissolution statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 governs 
this case. The applicable statute of limitations is the six-year 
limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) dealing with actions on 
written instruments. Even if the two-year limitation period 
applies, that limitation period is not absolute. The facts of this 
case and equity support the extension of that limitation period. 
The plaintiffs' claims are in the nature of "winding up" the 
affairs of The Travel Company. The purposes of the corporate 
dissolution statute are not violated by allowing The Travel 
Company's claims to proceed. 
Even if The Travel Company's claims are barred by the two-year 
corporate dissolution statute, William Hatton is entitled to pursue 
his individual claims against the defendants. Hatton is a named 
party to the Purchase Agreement and is in direct contractual 
privity with the defendants. The Prommisory Note is incorporated 
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as part of the Purchase Agreement. Hatton is also entitled to 
pursue this individual claim because the assets of The Travel 
Company passed to him on dissolution of the corporation. Finally, 
Hatton is a third-party creditor beneficiary of the Purchase 
Agreement and Promissory Note, entitling his to pursue his 
individual claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRAVEL COMPANY HAS COMPLIED WITH THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANN., §78-12-23(2) 
The defendants claim that the plaintiffs1 claims are barred by 
the two-year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. The 
plaintiffs argue that the complaint in this case was timely filed 
within the six-year limitation for claims on written contracts 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2). There can be no dispute that if 
the six-year statute of limitations applies, the plaintiff's claims 
are timely filed. The question is which limitation applies. 
The defense of statute of limitations is not favored by the 
courts. Woodward v. Chirco Construction, Inc., 141 Ariz. 520, 687 
P.2d 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). If two statutes of limitations 
may apply to a claim, the longer statute is preferred. As stated 
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Company v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 1981): 
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The statute of limitations is not such a meritorious 
defense that either the law or the facts should be 
strained in aid of it. (Citation omitted). Statutes 
prescribing a relatively short period of time for 
allowing actions are usually construed narrowly to the 
extent necessary to give the holder of a cause of action 
a fair opportunity to present his claim. Where two 
constructions to the limitations are possible, the 
Court? s prefer the one which gives the longer period in 
which to prosecute the action. 
Appellate courts consistently hold that where two statutes of 
limitations may govern a case, the longer statute of limitations is 
preferred. Theil v. Taurus Drilling, Ltd., 710 P.2d 33 (Mont. 
1985); Physical Therapy Associates v. Pinal County, 734 P. 2d 1 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). This Court supports that position in Juab 
County Department of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d 49, 146 
P.2d 1 (1967). The six-year limitation regarding actions on 
written contracts, therefore, is preferred over the more 
restrictive two-year corporate survival statute. 
Corporate survival statutes are not, as the defendants allege, 
to be strictly construed. As stated in Midland Financial 
Corporation v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 110 Wis. 2d 261, 
328 N.W. 2d 866, 867-68 (1982): 
Section 180.7887 Stats, is a corporate survival statute. 
This type of statute is of remedial nature and is to be 
liberally construed. 
That conclusion is consistent with Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2, 
which deals with the construction of statutes, like Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-100, in derogation of the common law: 
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The rule of common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application 
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish 
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. Whenever there is any variance between the 
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference 
to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail. 
It is the nature of the right sued upon, and not the specific 
form of the action or relief requested, which determines the 
applicable statute of limitations. Richards Engineering, Inc. v. 
Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). That position was 
supported by this Court in Taylor Brothers Co. v. Duden, 188 P.2d 
1995 (Utah 1948). The nature of this action is to collect under 
the terms of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. As such, 
this is an action on a written contract, governed by the six-year 
limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2). 
Case law and the facts of this action support the conclusion 
that the six-year statute of limitations governs this case; not the 
shorter two-year corporate survival statute. The trial court erred 
in concluding that the two-year limitation of the corporate 
dissolution statute bars to the plaintiffs' claims. 
POINT II 
THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE SURVIVAL STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IS NOT ABSOLUTE. THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THIS CASE DICTATE THAT THE TWO-YEAR 
LIMITATION PERIOD BE EXTENDED. 
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The two-year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 is not 
absolute and may be extended under appropriate circumstances. 
North American Asbestos v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 128 
Cal. App. 3d 138 (1982). As stated in Moore v. Nick's Fine Foods, 
Inc. . 121 111. App. 3d 923, 460 N.E. 2d 420, 421 (1984): 
We agree with the defendant that the general policy 
behind the corporate dissolution statute is to set a 
definitive point in time at which the existence of a 
corporation and the transaction of its business are 
terminated. (Citation omitted); however, we also note 
that the two-year limitation on corporate survival is not 
absolute and may be extended under certain circumstances. 
(Citations omitted). 
The circumstances of this case, and the principles of equity 
allowed by Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2, dictate that the Travel Company 
be allowed to pursue this claim. 
This claim was initially filed in June of 1988, within the 
defendant's claimed two-year limitation period. That claim was 
dismissed without prejudice because of a potential conflict of 
interest of HattonTs prior counsel. Hatton continued to pursue the 
claim with a filing in the federal court in Montana in March of 
1991. That case was dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, not on 
the merits. The plaintiffs now bring this action. 
This case is similar to Striker v. Chester, 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 
1966), in which trustees of a dissolved corporation brought an 
action for "the recovery of moneys and other property" allegedly 
belonging to the dissolved corporation. Ld. at 36. The claim had 
13 
initially been timely filed, but went through a convoluted 
procedural history of many years, and questions were raised as to 
whether the claim was filed after the corporate dissolution statute 
expired. 
In allowing the claim to go forward, the Striker Court 
concluded: 
As in most jurisdictions, the above cited Michigan 
[corporate survival] statute governing the affairs of 
corporations whose drafters have been voided in one 
manner or another has been liberally interpreted in that 
state, John J. Gamalski Hardware v. Baird, 298 Mich. 662, 
299 N.W. 757, 136 A.C.R. 155. The cited case involved a 
claim of replevin instituted for the repossession of 
corporate property, such claiming having been filed more 
than three years after the corporation's charter had been 
forfeited. The court declined to deprive such 
corporation of its right. . . . In other words, while 
the so-called statutory death of a corporation in 
Michigan clearly prevents any continuation of its normal 
business as well as the instituting of a new suit, such 
as one to enjoin the use of trade name once owned by a 
corporation whose charter has been voided (citation 
omitted), it does not prevent the prosecution of an 
action which is directly related to the process of 
winding up corporate affairs. 
In discussing the type of "winding-up" action allowed even 
after the expiration of the survival statute, the Striker Court 
concluded: 
While the present action seeks an accounting and other 
equitable relief, it appears to me that what is basically 
sought is the recovery of moneys and other property 
allegedly belonging to Ridgeway under a claim instituted 
on its behalf in 1957. No attempt is being made to 
continue the corporate business or to institute a new 
cause of action. In fact, what appears to be sought is 
the taking over of a long pending claim. 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the trustees are not 
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bound by the three-year statutory period of the Michigan 
law and may prosecute the pending action. . . . 
Id. at 36. 
The facts of this case are similar to those in Striker. The 
plaintiffs here seek only recovery under the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement and Promissory Note. This is not an attempt to somehow 
continue the Travel Company business. The purposes of the 
corporation dissolution survival statute are not violated by 
allowing this claim to proceed. 
Finally, equity requires that the defendants not be allowed to 
raise the two-year statute to defeat the Travel Company's claim. 
Such a ruling would allow companies purchasing the assets of 
another company with long-term payout provision to avoid 
contractually accepted responsibility. For example, in this case, 
the Promissory Note provides for installment payments from April 
30, 1986 through April 30, 1990. The Agreement also provides that 
the Travel Company name and all other assets were transferred to 
Morris Travel on the date of closing. Morris Travel subsumed the 
Travel Company, not using the Travel Company name or separate 
business entity. That's why the Travel Company was dissolved; it 
didn't have any reason for a continuing existence after the 
execution of the Purchase Agreement. 
If its motion is granted, Morris is allowed to have the Travel 
Company dissolved and claim that any payments due on the Note are, 
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as a matter of law, unrecoverable, even when Morris specifically 
contracted to make payments beyond the two-year period. That's not 
right and shouldn't be allowed. What would prevent a company from 
buying another corporation, providing for a balloon payment for the 
purchase price three years down the road and then voluntarily 
dissolving the purchased corporation, avoiding any repayment? 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in not extending the 
two-year corporate survival statute in this case. 
POINT III 
THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE SURVIVAL STATUTE OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10-100 APPLIES ONLY TO 
PREDISSOLUTION CAUSES OF ACTION. THIS CASE 
INVOLVES A POSTDISSOLUTION CAUSE OF ACTION. 
In Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 
184 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals clarified the 
purpose and scope of the two-year corporate dissolution statute of 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. The Hansen opinion was issued on July 
20, 1993, over a month after Judge Brian's Order and Final Judgment 
in this case. While the Hansen case and the present case have some 
similarities, the main focus of the Hansen was the applicability of 
the "savings statute" of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 to claims filed 
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. The language in the Hansen 
decision important to this appeal is as follows: 
The defendants breached the contract when the assets were 
retained longer than contractually agreed upon. This 
event created a cause of action. Section 16-10-100 of 
the Utah Code places a two year limitation on the time in 
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which a dissolved corporation can bring a suit for a 
predissolution cause of action. Utah Code Ann. §16-10-
100 (1991). The corporate plaintiffs were dissolved on 
December 31, 1984. The six-month period agreed upon by 
the plaintiffs and defendants for returning the assets 
ended on June 13, 1983, making the breach of the P & A 
Agreement a predissolution cause of action. 
Id. at 105. (Emphasis added). 
Unlike the situation in Hansen, the plaintiffs1 cause of 
action for breach of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note is 
a postdissolution cause of action. The Travel Company was 
involuntarily dissolved for failure to file an annual report on 
October 1, 1987. (R. 74). After dissolution, the parties disagreed 
over payments owed by Morris under the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement and Promissory Note. In February of 1988, Morris made 
payment to the plaintiffs to cover installments due under the 
Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. That payment covered 
amounts due on April 30, 1987; July 31, 1987; October 31, 1987; and 
January 31, 1988. That February 1988 payment brought Morris 
current on its obligations through Janaury 31, 1988. The next 
installment payment was due on April 30, 1988 (R. 137). 
That April 30, 1988 was not made and on June 30, 1988, The 
Travel Company, through prior counsel, filed a lawsuit in the Third 
Judicial District Court against the defendants to collect moneys 
owed under the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. (R. 75-96). 
The plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of the Purchase 
Agreement and Promissory Note did not accrue until April 30, 1988, 
when the owed installment payment was not made. Based on those 
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dates, this is a postdissolution cause of action, which did not 
accrue until approximately seven months after The Travel Company 
was dissolved. 
Under Hansen, the plaintiffs argue that the two-year 
dissolution statute does not apply to postdissolution causes of 
action. That makes sense. The statute is designed to give 
corporations a period of time to "wind up" corporate affairs. Any 
cause of action accruing before dissolution can be brought within 
two years. That two-year statute should not, however, apply to 
postdissolution causes of action. Depending on the nature of the 
cause of action, it may not accrue until two years after 
dissolution. If the two-year statute is applied to those 
postdissolution claims, a dissolved corporation may be deprived of 
a cause of action before the cause of action accrues. It is that 
type of inequity which this Court has used to strike down as 
unconstitutional similar statutes of limitations. See Berry ex 
rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
For these reasons, the two-year corporate survival statute 
does not apply to postdissolution causes of action and cannot be 
used to bar the plaintiffs* claims in this case. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE DISSOLUTION 
STATUTE APPLIES, THAT LIMITATION BARS ONLY 
TRAVEL COMPANY CLAIMS, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL 
CLAMS OF WILLIAM HATTON 
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Even if the two-year corporate dissolution statute applies in 
this case, it bars only Travel Company claims and has no effect on 
William Hattonfs ability to pursue his individual claims against 
the defendants under the terms of the Agreement and Promissory 
Note. 
A. Hatton is in Direct Contractual Privity with Morris 
Travel, Entitling Him to Bring this Claim Individually. 
William Hatton, as an individual, is a separate party to the 
Purchase Agreement. The Travel Company and Morris Travel are 
parties to the Purchase Agreement, having the Purchase Agreement 
signed by their respective presidents. William Hatton and Wanda 
Hatton are individual signers of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 119, 
133). Paragraph 19(b) of the Purchase Agreement specifically 
provides that all of the terms of the Purchase Agreement are 
"binding upon and inure to the benefit of . . . Buyer, Seller and 
the Hattons." (R. 203). If all of the Hattons* rights under the 
Purchase Agreement were solely derivative through the Travel 
Company, it would be meaningless to identify them as separate 
parties to the Agreement. 
Basic rules of contract construction provide that provisions 
of a contract are deemed to be included for a reason and that 
construction of an agreement which renders any part of it 
meaningless should be avoided. Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane and 
Equipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 (1984). A contract 
is to be strictly construed against its drafter. Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); Matter of Orris' Estate, 622 
19 
P2d 337 (Utah 1980). Except for minor alterations, the Purchase 
Agreement was drafted by lawyers of Morris Travel. (R. 143-144). 
If there is any ambiguity or inconsistency in the contract, it 
must, therefore, be strictly construed against Morris Travel. The 
Purchase Agreement is unambiguous in granting individual rights to 
the Hattons to enforce it. (R. 203). Any individual claim is 
governed by the six-year limitation of Utah Code Ann §78-12-23(2) 
and is timely filed. 
Hatton can pursue this claim because he is an individual party 
to the Purchase Agreement. Just because he is also a shareholder 
in the dissolved corporation does not change that. As a general 
rule, a shareholder has no individual cause of action for injuries 
to his corporation. This rule is designed to prevent multiple 
suits against the wrongdoer. Any other rule would allow "as many 
suits against the wrongdoer as there were stockholders in the 
corporation." Wells v. Paine, 101 Me. 67, 63 A. 324, 235 (1905). 
There are two major exceptions to that general rule. First, a 
shareholder may bring an individual action where the shareholder 
suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by 
other shareholders and, second, a shareholder may bring an 
individual action where there is a special duty, such as a 
contractual duty, between the alleged wrongdoer and the 
shareholder. Hikita v. Nichiro Gyoqyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197 
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(Alaska 1986); W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Law of Private 
Corporations, §5991 at 421 (1984). These two exceptions are 
disjunctive, not conjunctive. The Hikita Court states: 
We hold that a shareholder can sue for breach of contract 
to which he is a party, even if he has not suffered an 
injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other 
shareholders. . . . "Unquestionably a stockholder may 
bring suit in his own name to recover damages. . . for 
acts which are violations of a duty arising from contract 
or otherwise and owing directly . . . to the injured 
stockholder, though such acts are also violations of duty 
owing to the corporation." (Citation omitted). 
Id. at 1200. 
There can be no dispute that William Hatton is a party to the 
Purchase Agreement with the defendants. As such, he has an 
individual claim for breach of the Purchase Agreement. According 
to his divorce settlement with Wanda Hatton, William Hatton was 
given the authority to pursue this claim on behalf of himself and 
Wanda Hatton. (R. 136). 
B. Hatton is Entitled to Pursue His Individual Claim Because 
Any and All Assets of the Travel Company, as a Dissolved 
Corporation, Vest in its Stockholders 
In addition to his ability to bring an individual claim on the 
contract, Hatton is allowed to pursue this individual claim because 
of his interest in the dissolved corporation's assets. The 
dissolution of a corporation does not terminate the property rights 
of the stockholders. The property of the corporation becomes 
vested in its members and stockholders upon dissolution. Levy v. 
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Liebling, 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956), The Court in Levy 
continued: 
Thus, we thing it can hardly be open to doubt but that 
the stockholders, at the time Imperial became extinct for 
all purposes including the two-year period allowed by 
Kentucky law for the winding up of its business, acquired 
the title to and became the owners of the judgment which 
they now seek to enforce. . . . 
It is thus our conclusion that plaintiffs were not 
lacking in capacity to sue because Imperial, of which 
they were former stockholders, after its dissolution 
lacked such capacity. 
This position is supported by the dissolution distribution 
procedure in Utah applicable when this cause of action arose. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§16-10-87; 16-10-93; 16-10-97. 
The time within which an individual must bring a claim on a 
contract is the six-year limitation period of Utah Code Ann. §78-
12-23(2). This individual contract claim was brought within that 
six-year limitation period 
C. Hatton may Pursue this Claim 
Individually as a Third-Party 
Beneficiary of the Purchase 
Agreement between Morris Travel and 
The Travel Company 
If, for any reason, this Court concludes that Hatton is not a 
direct named party to the Purchase Agreement and/or Promissory 
Note, Hatton may still pursue this claim individually as a third-
party beneficiary to the Purchase Agreement between Morris Travel 
and the Travel Company. This Court has stated: 
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Where it appears from the promise or the contracting 
situation that the parties intended that a third party 
receive a benefit, the third party may enforce his rights 
in the courts and is deemed a donee beneficiary. Where, 
however, no intention to make a gift appears and 
performance of the promise satisfies or recognizes an 
actual or supposed duty of the promise to the 
beneficiary, then the third party may still recover as a 
creditor beneficiary. 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315-16 
(Utah 1982). 
It is clear from the contracting circumstances that William 
and Wanda Hatton are creditor beneficiaries of the Promissory Note 
between Morris Travel and the Travel Company. Everyone knew the 
Hattons were the sole shareholders and the only individuals to 
receive payment under the Note. The Travel Company was going to be 
incorporated into Morris Travel. This is confirmed by the letter 
from Morris Travel's counsel (R. 141-142), requiring approval by 
William and Wanda Hatton regarding payments made on the Note. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is the six-
year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2); not the two-year 
corporate dissolution statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. 
Further, that two-year limitation only applies to predissolution 
causes of action, not the plaintiffs1 postdissolution cause of 
action. Even if this Court determines that the two-year limitation 
of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 does apply to this case, that 
limitation is not absolute. The facts of this case and equity 
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support the extension of that limitation period. This is an action 
in the nature of "winding up" the affairs of the Travel Company, 
The purposes of the corporation survival statute are not violated 
by allowing the Travel Company's claim to proceed. 
Regardless of the trial courtf s conclusions regarding the 
claims of The Travel Company, William Hatton is entitled to pursue 
his individual claim against Morris. Hatton is a named party to 
the Purchase Agreement and in direct contractual privity with the 
defendants, entitled to pursue his individual claim. Hatton is 
also entitled to pursue this individual claim as the assets of the 
Travel Company passed to him on dissolution. Finally, Hatton is 
clearly a third party creditor beneficiary of the Agreement and 
Promissory Note. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting the 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment. The trial court's 
conclusions should be reversed and this case should be remanded to 
the trial court for trial on the merits. 
DATED this £>E »day of January, 1994. 
GORDON K. JENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
16-10-100- Survival of remedy after dissolution. 
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of 
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) by a 
decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of 
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of 
duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against 
the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim 
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other 
proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of such 
dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the corporation may 
be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The share-
holders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other 
action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such 
corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such 
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such 
period of two years so as to extend its period of duration. 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally 
construed — Rules of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
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On June 4, 1993, the Court heard argument on 
defendant Morris Travel Express Corporation's ("Morris") 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Alternatively for 
Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs The Travel Company and William 
Hatton ("Hatton") were represented by Gordon Jensen and 
defendant Morris was represented by Alan C. Bradshaw. Both 
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R. Civ. P., the Court treats Morris' motion as a Motion for 
Summary Judgment under Rule 56. Plaintiffs did not dispute 
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the facts recited in support of Morris' motion and those facts 
are deemed admitted pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 
Rule 4-501(2) (b) .l Having considered the arguments of counsel 
and having reviewed the memoranda and submissions of the 
parties, the Court hereby Orders and presents ins findings as 
follows: 
1. The Court finds that pursuant to the unambiguous 
terms of the Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Assets ("Asset 
Purchase Agreement") as well as the Note attached as an 
exhibit to the Asset Purchase Agreement, all monetary or other 
unsatisfied obligations allegedly owed by Morris are corporate 
claims of The Travel Company and Hatton has no claim 
concerning those obligations. Specifically, amounts allegedly 
owed under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Asset Purchase Agreement 
and under the Note are obligations owed The Travel Company. 
The Court finds that the Note and Ass.et Purchase Agreement, 
including paragraph 19(b) of the Asset Purchase Agreement, do 
not give Hatton any claim to sue for the obligations due The 
Travel Company. 
2. The claims under the Note and Asset Purchase 
Agreement, whether asserted by Hatton or The Travel Company, 
must be timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) . 
Concerning ^10 °f Morris' Statement of Facts, plaintiffs admitted the 
fact that it accepted a payment in 1988 but added their contention that 
the acceptance "was not intended as a resolution of this claim." 
Opposition Memo at 3. 
Based upon the undisputed facts, those claims were not timely 
asserted under § 16-10-100. 
3. The Court finds that its ruling is further 
supported by the following: 
(a) The 1988 Complaint filed by Hatton on 
behalf of The Travel Company asserts these same claims and 
does so on the basis that the claims are corporate obligations 
owed The Travel Company; 
(b) The documents filed in Hatton's divorce 
proceeding provide that potential claims to be asserted 
against Morris are corporate claims of The Travel Company and 
that Hatton and his spouse are successor shareholders of those 
corporate claims; and 
(c) The substantive allegations contained in 
plaintiffs' present Complaint are limited to claims that The 
Travel Company is owed obligations by Morris. 
4. Based upon but not limited to all of the reasons 
cited above, the Court hereby grants Morris' motion and 
plaintiffs7 Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this / // day of June, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
AGREEMENT FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE 
OF ASSETS 
THIS AGREEMENT, dated as of April 15, 1985, is 
entered into by and between THE TRAVEL COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation ("Seller"), MORRIS TRAVEL CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation ("Buyer"), and WILLIAM AND WANDA HATTON 
(the "Hattons"). 
Recitals 
A. Seller owns and operates a travel agency 
located at the following three offices: 2089 W. North 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116; 5151 Wiley Post Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116; and 515 East 100 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. Seller is doing business at all 
locations under the name "The Travel Company." 
B. Seller desires to sell the Assets (as 
defined below) used by Seller in the operation of its 
business and the Buyer desires to purchase the same, upon 
the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement. 
C. The Hattons own all of the stock of Seller. 
The Hattons are joining in and agreeing to be bound by 
this Agreement in consideration of Buyer's entering into 
this Agreement. 
COPY 
Agreement 
In consideration of the recitals and mutual 
promises contained herein, Seller and Buyer hereby agree 
as follows: 
1. Sale and Purchase, On the date of the 
Closing (as hereinafter defined), subject to the terms and 
cor.ditiions hereinafter set forth, Seller agrees to sell, 
transfer and convey to Buyer, and Buyer agrees to purchase 
from Seller, ail right, title and interest of Seller in 
and co the following: 
(a) The name "The Travel Company," and all 
variations and derivations thereof and all goodwill 
associated therewith, as such names are now or formerly 
have been used by Seller in connection with Seller's 
business operations in the state of Utah or any other 
s : 2 •; e . 
[hi All o f f i c e f u r n i t u r e , equip:u(-:-t and 
s-.t'-iies including., w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n , ces\sf c h a i r s , 
tile c a b i n e t s , t y p e w r i t e r s , c o m p u t e r t e r m i n a l s and p r i n t e d 
.n~cerials located at Seller's place of business or 
otherwise used in connection with Seller's business (the 
"Office Equipment"). 
(c) All of Seller's accounts, customer 
lists, records, computer tapes, computer discs, and other 
documents and any ether form of information relating to 
ths ooera-ior. of Seller's travel business ani the 
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telephone numbers utilized by Seller. At Closing, Seller 
shall provide to Buyer a complete list of Seller's 
accounts as of the Closing date. 
(d) The three lease agreements 
dated , , and _, 
respectively, (the "Office Leases"), for occupancy of 
Seller's three business locations (collectively, the 
"Premises"). 
(e) All airline equipment leases (the 
"Airline Equipment Leases") to which Seller is a party. 
(f) All deposits on hand at the time of the 
Closing in respect of future travel arrangements for 
customers of Seller and the commissions to be earned with 
respect thereto, subject to the provisions of Section 6^ 
and Section 14 below. .../
 / . ^  .< .u*<i< ? 
(g) Any goodwill relating to Seller's 
business not already described in paragraph 1(a) above. 
(h) Any other assets, including without 
limitation any other leases or contracts, used by Seller 
in connection with its business, except for Seller's safe 
and Seller's automobiles; provided, however, that the 
automobile currently used by Wanda Hatton shall be 
included among the assets assigned to Buyer. 
The items described in paragraphs 1(a) through 
1(h) above are collectively referred to as the "Assets." 
-3-
2. Purchase Price and Payment Terms. Buyer 
agrees to pay a total purchase price of $700f000 for the 
Assets. $50,000 of the purchase price shall be allocated 
to the covenant not to compete with Buyer, more 
particularly described in Section 7 below. The remaining 
portion of the purchase price shall be allocated in a 
manner agreed by the parties at or prior to Closing. The 
purchase price shall be paid as follows: 
(a) At the time this Agreement is executed, 
Buyer shall deliver to Thomas E. Kelly of Holme Roberts & 
Owen the sum of $75,000 as an earnest money deposit to be 
held in escrow. At the Closing, this deposit shall be 
paid to Seller as part of the purchase price for the 
Assets. If the Closing does not occur on May 3, 1985, or 
before, for any reason other than Buyer's wrongful failure 
under the terms of this Agreement to close, the entire 
deposit shall be immediately returned to Buyer. If the 
Closing does not occur solely because of Buyer's wrongful 
failure to close under the terms of this Agreement, then 
the $75,000 deposit shall be paid to Seller as liquidated 
damages, and not as a penalty. 
(b) The additional sum of $125,000 shall be 
paid by Buyer to Seller at Closing hereunder in cash, 
certified funds or cashier's check; and 
(c) The sum of $500,000 (the "Deferred 
Payment"), subject to adjustment as described in Section 5 
below, shall be paid by Buyer to Seller as follows: 
-4-
On A p r i l 30 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; 
On October 3 1 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1987, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On October 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On October 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1989, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On October 3 1 , 1989, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1990, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1990, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 
I n t e r e s t s h a l l accrue on the outs tanding unpaid p r i n c i p a l 
amount of the Deferred Payment at a r a t e equal to the 
l e s s e r of 10% per annum or the prime r a t e of F i r s t 
I n t e r s t a t e Bank of Utah, N.A., on the f i r s t day of each 
q u a r t e r l y per iod descr ibed in the above schedule of 
payments. (For purposes of t h i s paragraph, "prime r a t e " 
s h a l l mean the lowest r a t e charged by F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e 
Bank to i t s commercial customers . ) Accrued i n t e r e s t s h a l l 
be due and payable at the time of the f i r s t p r i n c i p a l 
in s t a l lmen t payment on Apri l 30, 1986, and at the time of 
each succeeding p r i n c i p a l payment descr ibed above. The 
Deferred Payment s h a l l be evidenced by a promissory note 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y in the form of Exhibi t "A" a t tached here to 
and made pa r t hereof. 
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3. Additional Payments to Seller. 
(a) In addition to the payments described 
in Section 2 above, Seller shall be entitled to receive 
from Buyer the possible additional payments described in 
this Section 3. 
(b) For purposes of this Section 3, the 
following terms shall have the following definitions: 
(i) The Travel Company Accounts. 
All customer accounts of Seller at the time of the 
Closing, together with any additional accounts originated 
at the Premises during the period, if any, after Closing 
when Buyer continues to conduct business on the Premises 
and the Premises are accounted for by Buyer as separate 
profit centers. At such time as Buyer ceases to account 
for the Premises as separate profit centers, Buyer shall 
list for future accounting purposes all customer accounts 
then allocated to the Premises (including all customer 
accounts of Seller at the time of Closing). In addition, 
the term "The Travel Company Accounts" is defined to 
include any new accounts obtained for Buyer by the 
Hattons, or either of them, at any time following Closing 
until April 30, 1990. 
(ii) The Travel Company Revenues. 
All commissions or other forms of gross profits, less any 
commission sharing, that are obtained by Buyer as a result 
of The Travel Company Accounts. "The Travel Company 
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Revenues" is also defined to include The Travel Company's 
allocated share of all overrides and hotel and car 
commissions received by Buyer. This allocated share shall 
be determined by the following formula: 
Annual ARC Billings Buyer's Annual Amount to be 
for Travel Company Accounts x Overrides and = Included in 
Total Annual ARC Hotel and Car Calculating 
Billings of Buyer Commissions Travel Company Revenue 
(c) During each of the first five years 
following the Closing through April 30, 1990, Seller shall 
be entitled to 30% of the amount by which The Travel 
Company Revenues during any such year exceed the sum of 
$700,000. Any payments to which Seller is entitled under 
this paragraph are referred to in this Agreement as "Earn 
Out Payments." The Earn Out Payments, if any, to which 
Seller is entitled during the first five years after 
Closing shall be paid in the following manner: 
(i) within 30 days after the end of 
the first quarter of each year, Buyer shail pay to Seller 
30% of all Travel Company Revenues for such quarter in 
excess of $175,000; 
(ii) within 30 days after the end of 
the second quarter of each year, Buyer shall pay to Seller 
that amount which, when added to any first quarter Earn 
Out Payment, equals 30% of all Travel Company Revenues in 
excess of $350,0C0 for the first two quarters of the year; 
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(iii) within 30 days after the end of 
the third quarter of each year, Buyer shall pay to Seller 
that amount which, when added to any first and second 
quarter Earn Out Payments, equals 30% of all Travel 
Company Revenues in excess of $525,000 for the first three 
quarters of the year; and 
(iv) within 30 days after the end of 
each year, Buyer shall pay to Seller that amount which, 
when added to any first, second and third quarter Earn Out 
Payments, equals 30% of Travel Company Revenues in excess 
of $700,000 for the year. 
(v) If in any year the aggregate total 
of quarterly Earn Out Payments received by Seller exceeds 
30% of Travel Company Revenues over $700,000 for the year, 
Buyer may deduct that excess from either future Earn Out 
Payments or from payments under the Deferred Payment Note. 
4. Adjustment of Purchase Price. The 
purchase price described in paragraph 2 above has been 
calculated based upon the assumption that all or the great 
majority of accounts serviced by Seller at Closing shall 
remain with Buyer. Seller anticipates that the accounts 
assigned to Buyer at Closing (as disclosed by the list to 
be provided pursuant to paragraph 1(c) above) will 
generate a commission volume of at least $700,000 from May 
1, 1985 through April 30, 1986. If actual commissions for 
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such period from the accounts listed are less than 
$700,000, the Deferred Payment to be paid by Buyer to 
Seller shall be reduced as follows: 
(a) If commissions received are not more 
than 10% below $700,000, there shall be no Deferred 
Payment reduction. 
(b) If commissions received are between 
10.1% and 15% below $700,000, then for every $1.00 in 
annualized commission revenues not obtained, the Deferred 
Payment shall be reduced by $.50 for this incremental 
shortfall only. 
(c) If commissions received are between 
15.1% and 20% below $700,000, then for every $1.00 in 
annualized commission revenues not obtained, there will be 
a $1.00 downward adjustment in the Deferred Payment for 
this incremental shortfall only. 
(d) If commissions actually received are 
more than 20.1% below $700,000, then for every $1.00 in 
annualized commission revenues not obtained, there will be 
a $1.50 downward adjustment in the Deferred Payment for 
this incremental shortfall only. 
(e) Any downward adjustments to the 
Deferred Payment pursuant to the foregoing provisions 
shall be subtracted starting with the last installment due 
under paragraph 2 above and proceeding forward in time as 
necessary. 
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5. No Assumption of Liabilities. Except 
with respect to the Office Leases, the Airline Equipment 
Leases, the unearned commissions described in Section 6 
below, and any other contracts specifically assigned to 
Buyer at Closing, Buyer is not assuming any liabilities or 
obligations of, or claims against, Seller or the Hattons, 
whether fixed or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated. 
Seller and the Hattons agree to indemnify and hold Buyer 
harmless from any and all such liabilities. 
6. Advanced Commissions. 
(a) The parties acknowledge that among the 
Assets being assigned to Buyer by Seller are advanced 
commissions received by Seller for certain tours and 
cruises already scheduled by Seller. At Closing, Seller 
and Buyer shall initial for identification a list of all 
advanced commissions being assigned to Buyer. Not more 
than two weeks after the completion of each listed tour or 
cruise, the entire commission relating thereto, minus 
direct expenses attributable to such tour or cruise 
(including salaries, postage, publicity and such items, 
but not including general overhead) shall be paid by Buyer 
to Seller. If direct expenses from any listed tour or 
cruise exceed the commissions received with respect 
thereto, Seller shall reimburse Buyer within two weeks of 
demand for all such expenses in excess of commissions. If 
Seller fails to reimburse Buyer, Buyer may offset the 
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amounts to which it is entitled against any of Buyer's 
obligations to Seller. 
(b) In addition, Seller shall assign to 
Buyer at Closing all advanced commissions relating to a 
National ACRE Conference scheduled for March, 1987, in 
Hawaii, Buyer shall not have the responsibility to pay to 
Seller any commissions relating to this tour, nor shall 
Seller be responsible to Buyer for any losses resulting 
from this tour. 
(c) If Seller has received any advanced 
commissions other than those specifically set forth on the 
list to be delivered at Closing as described in paragraph 
6(a) above, such other advanced commissions shall remain 
the property of Seller following the Closing, and Buyer 
shall assume no liability whatsoever to provide the 
services for which such commissions were paid to Seller. 
(d) The provisions of this Section 6 are 
subject to the provisions of Section 14 below. 
1. Confidentiality and Covenant Not to Compete. 
(a) In order to protect the purchase of the 
Assets, Seller and the Hattons agree that they will not, 
individually or collectively, or in conjunction with 
others, at any time after execution hereof, except with 
the express prior written consent of Buyer, directly or 
indirectly, disclose, communicate or divulge to any 
"Person" (which is defined to include any natural person, 
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corporation, trust, estate, partnership or other entity), 
or use for the benefit of any Person, any knowledge or 
information with respect to the conduct or details of 
Seller's business being sold to Buyer hereunder including, 
but not limited to, accounts, details of all contracts, 
client lists, fees, costs, marketing methods, trade 
secrets or confidential information. 
(b) Seller and the Hattons each covenant 
and agree that they will not, for the period commencing on 
the date hereof and continuing until five years after the 
Closing Date, except with the express prior written 
consent of Buyer, directly or indirectly, whether as 
employee, owner, partner, agent, shareholder or in any 
other capacity, for its or their accounts or for the 
benefit of any Person in any business in competition with 
Buyer: 
(i) Solicit, divert, accept business 
from or otherwise take away or interfere with any former, 
present or future customer or account of Buyer or former 
or present customers or accounts of Seller, including, but 
not limited to, all customers and accounts directly or 
indirectly previously or in the future produced or 
generated by Seller or the Hattons; 
(ii) Solicit, divert or induce any of 
Seller's employees to leave Seller's business being sold 
hereunder or to work for Seller or either of the Hattons 
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or any Person with which Seller or either of the Hattons 
is connected. 
(c) Seller and the Hattons each covenant 
and agree that they will not, for the period commencing on 
the date hereof and continuing until five years after the 
Closing Date, in any capacity (including, but not limited 
to, owner, partner, shareholder, consultant, agent, 
employee or otherwise), directly or indirectly, for their 
own accounts or for the benefit of any Person, establish, 
engage in or be connected with any travel-related business 
in competition with Buyer, within the State of Utah, 
(d) Wanda Hatton shall execute at Closing 
an employment agreement in a form substantially similar to 
Exhibit B hereto, or such other form mutually agreed upon 
by the parties. 
(e) The parties agree that any breach by 
Seller or the Hattons of the covenants and agreements 
contained in this Section 7 will result in irreparable 
injury to.Buyer for which money damages could not 
adequately compensate Buyer, and, therefore, in the event 
of any such breach, Buyer shall be entitled (in addition 
to any other rights and remedies which it may have at law 
or in equity) to have an injunction issued by any 
competent court of equity enjoining and restraining Seller 
and the Hattons, or either of them, and any other Person 
involved therein from continuing such breach. 
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(f) If any portions of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, or the application thereof, 
are construed to be invalid or unenforceable, then the 
other portions of such covenant(s) or agreement(s) or the 
application thereof shall be given full force and effect 
without regard to the invalid or unenforceable portions. 
If any covenant or agreement herein is held to be 
unenforceable because of the area covered, the duration 
thereof or the scope thereof, then the court making such 
determination shall have the power to reduce the area or 
duration or limit the scope thereof, and the covenant or 
agreement shall then be enforceable in its reduced and/or 
limited form. 
8. Closing. The closing hereunder 
("Closing") shall take place on May 3, 1985, at 10:00 a.m. 
at Buyer's offices, or such other time and place as shall 
be agreed to by all parties hereto. For accounting 
purposes, the Closing shall be effective as of April 28, 
1985. 
9. Representations and Warranties of Seller 
and the Hattons. Seller and the Hattons, jointly and 
severally, warrant and represent the following: 
(a) (i) Seller is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under 
Utah law, has the corporate power to own the Assets and 
enter into this Agreement and perform the transactions 
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contemplated hereby, and carry on its business as and 
where such business is now conducted; Seller has all 
licenses and permits required to conduct Seller's business 
and such business is being conducted in compliance with 
all applicable Federal, State and local laws; 
(ii) Within the past five years in the 
State of Utah, neither Seller nor the Hattons have done 
travel-related business under or been known by any name 
other than The Travel Company; and 
(iii) The sale, transfer, assignment, 
conveyance and delivery of the Assets conveyed and 
assigned hereunder to Buyer, and the Execution and 
performance by Seller and the Hattons of this Agreement 
comply with all relevant Federal, State and local laws, 
and will not violate, conflict with, or result in a breach 
of or default or liability under Seller's Articles of 
Incorporation or Bylaws, or any agreement or instrument to 
which Seller is a party or result in the creation or 
imposition of any mortgage, lien, security interest, 
encumbrance or pledge, or, to the best of Seller's and the 
Hatton's knowledge, any executions, attachments or claims 
in or to any of their property or the Assets. 
(b) (i) Seller is, and upon Closing 
hereunder, Buyer will be, the sole and unconditional owner 
of, with good and absolute legal and equitable title 
thereto, all of the Assets, free and clear of all 
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mortgages, liens, security interests, pledges, charges, 
encumbrances, or, to the best of Seller's and the Hatton's 
knowledge, all executions, attachments and claims; 
(ii) The copies of the Office Lease and 
the Airline Equipment Leases provided to Buyer are true, 
complete and correct copies thereof, and there are no oral 
understandings that differ from or vary the terms 
thereof. To the best of Seller's and the Hatton's 
knowledge, no party to any such lease or any other 
contract specifically assigned to Buyer is in default; 
(iii) Seller has the full and 
unrestricted right to use the name "The Travel Company" 
and variations thereof in the State of Utah without 
obligation to pay any royalty fee or other compensation 
and its use does not infringe upon any other tradename, 
servicemark or trademark; 
(iv) Seller has no union contracts, no 
employees except for the Hattons and those disclosed in 
writing to Buyer, and no pension or profit sharing or 
other benefit plans; 
(v) Seller is not a party to any 
contracts, whether written or oral, except the Office 
Leases and the Airline Equipment Leases, and except as 
have been disclosed to Buyer by Seller in writing. 
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(c) (i) The execution and performance of 
this Agreement have been duly and validly authorized by 
Seller's shareholders and Board of Directors; 
(ii) All lists, schedules, exhibits, 
documents, certifications, financial statements, 
certificates, contracts and other papers given or to be 
given hereunder or in connection with or attached to this 
Agreement and all representations and warranties by Seller 
and the Hattons to Buyer are true, correct and complete. 
The financial statements given to Buyer by Seller fairly 
and completely present the financial condition of Seller 
at the dates indicated and the results of operations for 
the periods ended on such dates, and have been prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
consistently followed throughout the periods indicated; 
(iii) All debts, liabilities and 
obligations of Seller including, but not limited to, taxes 
have been satisfied; 
(iv) No breach of contract, tort or 
other claim (whether arising from Seller's business 
operations or otherwise) has been asserted by any 
employee, creditor, claimant or other person against 
Seller nor has there, to the best of Seller's or the 
Hatton's knowledge, been any occurrence which could give 
rise to such a claim; nor has any suit, action or 
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proceeding been threatened or commenced against Seller 
involving such a claim; 
(v) The execution and performance of 
this Agreement shall not render Buyer liable for any of 
Seller's or the Hatton's debts, liabilities or obligations 
(except under the Office Leases, the Airline Equipment 
Leases and any other contracts specifically assigned to 
Buyer, and with respect to any unearned commissions 
assigned to Buyer pursuant to Section 6 above), now 
existing or hereafter arising, to employees, creditors, 
claimants or other persons, including, but not limited to, 
tax obligations, employment contracts, or pension, profit 
sharing or other benefit plans; and 
(vi) No suit, action or proceeding is 
pending or threatened which would restrain the execution 
or performance of this Agreement. 
10, Representations and Warranties of Buyer. 
Buyer represents and warrants as follows: 
(a) Buyer is a corporation validly 
organized and in good standing under the laws of the State 
of Utah, has the corporate power to own its assets and to 
enter into this Agreement and perform the transactions 
contemplated hereby, and carry on its business as and 
where such business is now conducted; Buyer has all 
licenses and permits required to conduct Buyer's business 
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and such business is being conducted in compliance with 
all applicable federal, state and local lavs; 
(b) The execution and performance of this 
Agreement have been duly authorized by all requisite 
corporate action on the part of Buyer and its shareholders 
and directors; 
(c) No suitf action or proceeding is 
pending or threatened that would restrain the execution 
and performance of this Agreement by Buyer; and 
(d) Buyer has examined the Office Equipment 
and agrees to accept it "as is." 
11. Conduct Pending Closing. From and after 
the date hereof to, and including, the time of Closing: 
(a) Seller and the Hattons shall fully 
cooperate with Buyer and, in order to facilitate the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby in a 
smooth and orderly fashion, take such actions as are 
reasonably requested by Buyer, including without 
limitation: 
(i) Delivering to Buyer all notices, 
correspondence, and other items relating to the Assets and 
business of Seller which are from time to time received by 
or are in the possession of any of them; 
(ii) Assisting Buyer in transferring 
operations at the Premises on an uninterrupted basis, 
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including, but not limited to, introducing Buyer and 
Buyer's employees to customers and customers1 employees; 
(iii) Paying all of Seller's debts, 
liabilities and obligations, including, but not limited to 
taxes, as they become due. 
(b) Seller and the Hattons shall conduct 
the business in a good and diligent manner consistent with 
past practice and shall not, except with the prior written 
consent of Buyer, make any change in their business 
practices, and shall in good faith use their best efforts 
to preserve the business as a going concern, including, 
without limitation: 
(i) Keeping available the services of 
their current officers, employees, salesmen,agents and 
representat ives; 
(ii) Maintaining the good will of their 
suppliers, customers and other Persons having business 
relations with threm; and 
(iii) Continuing promotional activities 
and advertising of a nature and at levels consistent with 
past practices, 
(c) Seller shall not, except with the prior 
written consent of Buyer, do any of the following: 
(i) Make any disposition of any of the 
Assets; 
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(ii) Begin to engage in any significant 
new type of business; 
(iii) Enter into or commit to enter 
into any new contract or amend any existing contract or, 
other than in the ordinary course of business, grant any 
salary increase, bonus, or other form of compensation, 
payable to any officer, employee or agent. 
12. Conditions Precedent to the Buyer's Obligation 
to Complete Closing. The obligation of Buyer to close 
hereunder is subject to the satisfaction on or prior to 
the Closing of the following conditions precedent, any of 
which may be waived by Buyer at or prior to the Closing 
date. 
(a) The representations and warranties of 
Seller and the Hattons contained in this Agreement shall 
be true on and as of the Closing Date with the same effect 
as though such representations and warranties had been 
made on and as of such date; 
(b) Seller shall have fully performed, 
satisfied and complied with all of the covenants, 
agreements and conditions in this Agreement on its part to 
be performed on or prior to Closing; 
(c) There shall have been no material or 
adverse change in Seller's business or financial condition 
between the date hereof and Closing Date; 
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(d) Buyer shall have been given the 
opportunity to review and examine to its reasonable 
satisfaction the Assets and all contracts, leases, 
records, documents or other information relating to the 
Assets. 
(e) Seller shall deliver to Buyer: 
(i) One or more instruments or 
documents, in form satisfactory to Buyer and its counsel, 
transferring and assigning the Assets to Buyer; 
(ii) A legal opinion dated as of the 
Closing Date, of counsel for Seller admitted to practice 
in the State of Utah in form and substance satisfactory to 
Buyer and its counsel; 
(iii) An employment agreement 
substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B, or 
such other form as the parties shall agree, executed by 
Wanda Hatton. 
(iv) A written "Implementation Plan" 
reasonably satisfactory to Buyer specifying the manner in 
which Buyer will be introduced to Seller's customers. 
(f) Prior to Closing, Buyer shall have 
obtained the following: 
(i) A certificate from the Utah 
Division of Commercial Code, or other evidence reasonably 
satisfactory to Buyer, confirming that the Assets are 
subject to no lien or encumbrance; 
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(ii) Approval by the ARC and the IATA 
to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by 
this Agreement, including the operation of the. existing 
Travel Company offices by Buyer, or written assurances 
satisfactory to Buyer and its counsel that such consents 
are not required to consummate the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement. 
(iii) The written consent of the 
various landlords to the assignment of the Office Leases 
to Buyer, the written consent of the applicable airlines 
to the assignment of the Airline Equipment Leases, and 
such consents as Buyer shall deem necessary to the 
assignment of any other contracts to Buyer, Each such 
consent shall include a statement by the consenting party 
to the effect that the lease or contract is in full force 
and effect and that there is no default thereunder; 
(iv) A certificate, dated as of a 
recent date from the Secretary of the State of Utah that 
Seller is in good standing and a certificate also dated as 
of a recent date, from the appropriate department of the 
State of Utah showing there are no unpaid corporate taxes 
owed by Seller; and 
(g) Buyer and Seller shall have reached a 
mutually acceptable agreement as to whether, and in what 
form, one or more personal guarantees shall be given to 
Seller at Closing. 
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13. Conditions Precedent to Seller's Obligation 
to Complete Closing, The obligation of Seller to close 
hereunder is subject to the satisfaction at or prior to 
the Closing of the following conditions precedent, any of 
which may be waived by Seller at or prior to the Closing 
date. 
(a) The representations and warranties of 
Buyer contained in this Agreement shall be true on and as 
of the Closing date with the same effect as though such 
representations and warranties had been made on and as of 
such date; 
(b) Buyer shall have fully performed, . 
satisfied and complied with any covenants, agreements or 
conditionsin this Agreement on its part to be performed on 
or prior to Closing; 
(c) Buyer shall deliver to Seller: 
(i) the Promissory Note substantially 
in the form of Exhibit A hereto; 
(ii) the sum of $125,000 in cash, or 
certified funds or a cashierfs check, together with the -
earnest money deposit of $75,000 described in Section 2(a) 
above; 
(iii) a legal opinion dated as of the 
Closing Date, of counsel for Buyer, in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to Seller and its counsel; and 
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(d) Buyer and Seller shall have reached a 
mutually acceptable agreement as to whether, and in what 
form, one or more personal guarantees shall be given to 
Seller at Closing. 
14. Seller's Accounts Receivable. Seller's 
accounts receivable existing as of April 28, 1985, are 
expressly excluded from the transfer of the Assets 
described herein. Seller, however, appoints Buyer as 
Seller's agent to receive payments on Seller's accounts 
receivable and to send notices to Seller's customers to 
make payments to Buyer or otherwise demand payments from 
such customers. Except if otherwise designated by the 
customer, all monies received by Buyer shall be applied to 
the oldest outstanding invoice to such customer and Buyer 
shall account and make payments to Seller monthly within 
fifteen (15) days after the end of any month for monies 
collected during the preceding calendar month. On or 
about December 31, 1985, Buyer shall return all 
uncollected accounts to Seller (thereby terminating 
Buyer's agency) who shall thereafter have the right to 
collect the same in any manner Seller sees fit, provided, 
however, that Buyer shall have the option, in its sole 
discretion, to then purchase any of Seller's uncollected 
accounts for the full unpaid account balance thereof. 
Buyer shall receive payments merely as Seller's agent and 
shall have no obligation or duty to institute suits, incur 
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any expense or take any other action to collect Seller's 
accounts receivable. 
15. Brokers* Fees and Indemnification. 
(a) Seller and the Hattons, jointly and 
severally, represent and warrant to Buyer that none of 
them has employed or retained any broker or finder in 
connection with the transaction contemplated by this 
Agreement, other than Sontag, Annis & Associates (if so 
characterized), and none of them has had any dealings with 
any Person which may entitle that Person to a fee or 
commission. Seller shall be solely responsible for the 
payment of any fee or commission due to Sontag, Annis & 
Associates, Incorporated. 
(b) Each of the parties indemnifies and 
holds the other harmless from and against any debts, 
liabilities and obligations or claims, by virtue of any 
arrangement or commitment made by him or it with or to any 
Person that may entitle such Person to any fee or 
commission from such other party to this Agreement. 
(c) Seller and the Hattons, all jointly and 
severally, shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless 
Buyer, its successors and assigns from, against and in 
respect of: 
(i) all debts, liabilities and 
obligations of or claims against Seller or the Hattons or 
the Assets asserted against or collected from Buyer; 
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(ii) any damage, loss or deficiency 
resulting from any misrepresentation, breach of warranty 
or nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement on the part 
of Seller or the Hattons under this Agreement or any other 
document executed in connection herewith; and 
(iii) all actions, suits, proceedings, 
demands, settlements, assessments, judgments, costs, 
investigation expenses, interest, penalties, legal fees 
and expenses incident to any of the foregoing. 
(d) Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless Seller and the Hattons, and their successors and 
assigns, from, against and in respect of: 
(i) any damage, loss or deficiency 
resulting from any misrepresentation, breach of warranty 
or nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement on the part 
of Buyer under this Agreement or any other document 
executed in connection herewith; and 
(ii) all actions, suits, proceedings, 
demands, settlements, assessments, judgments, costs, 
investigation expenses, interests, penalties, legal fees 
and expenses reasonably instant to any of the foregoing 
matters described in Section 15(d)(i) above. 
16. Survival of Representations and Warranties. 
All representations, warranties and agreements made by 
Seller or the Hattons or Buyer in this Agreement or 
pursuant hereto are continuing and survive the execution 
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and performance of, and Closing under, this Agreement, the 
delivery of any documents, certifications, lists and 
instruments required hereunder and any investigation or 
inspection at any time made by or on behalf of any party 
hereto* Each warranty, representation and agreement 
contained herein is independent of all other warranties, 
representations and agreements contained herein (whether 
or not covering an identical or related subject matter) 
and must be independently and separately complied with and 
satisfied. No representation or warranty or agreement 
made herein shall be limited in its construction by 
reference to or from any others such provision. 
17. Further Assurances. Seller, the Kattons 
and Buyer shall execute from time to time any and all 
further documents, instruments or agreements and do all 
other things and deliver all items, which may be 
reasonably necessary to effectuate and carry out any and 
all of the provisions of this Agreement and the 
transactions provided for herein. 
18. Risk of Loss. All risk of loss relating 
to the Assets shall remain solely with Seller until 
Closing. 
19. Miscellaneous. 
(a) All notices, requests, demands and 
other communications hereunder shall be in writing and 
shall be deemed to have been duly given if delivered 
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personally against receipt or mailed, postage prepaid, by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
Seller and the Hattons at 4?>V AbO.VlJ> D&Ot- £L(L UTM/l^ 
and to Buyer at 361 Lavndale Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 
&i\\$~Ji41r£§>f or to such other address as any party hereto may 
properly designate in writing in accordance herewith. 
(b) All of the terms of this Agreement 
shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of, and 
shall be enforceable by the heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors, legal representatives and 
assigns of Buyer, Seller and the Hattons. 
(c) All words shall be construed to be of 
such gender and number as the circumstances require. 
(d) This Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement of the parties with respect to the subject 
matter hereof and may not be revised, modified or waived 
except in writing signed by all the parties hereto. 
(e) This Agreement shall be governed by the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
(f) If any portion of this Agreement is 
adjudged invalid, uneforceable or void, the remainder 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
(g) No failure or delay of any party hereto 
to exercise any right or remedy hereunder shall operate as 
a waiver thereof. A waiver on one occasion shall not be 
construed as a waiver or as a bar to any right or remedy 
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on any future occasion for that breach or default or any 
subsequent breach or default, 
(h) If any of the Assets are subject to 
taxes, assessments or similar charges not yet due and 
payable, such taxes, assessments or similar charges shall 
be prorated as of April 28, 1985, between Seller and Buyer. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed 
this Agreement as of the day first written above. 
SELLER: THE TRAVEL BUYER: MORRIS TRAVEL 
COMPANY, INC. CORPORATION 
WANDA HATTOfi/ 
0445N 
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EXHIBIT A 
(attached to and forming a part of that certain 
Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of 
Assets between The Travel Company, Inc., 
Morris Travel Corporation, and William 
and Wanda Hatton dated as of April 15, 1985) 
Promissory Note 
April 30, 1985 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Morris Travel Corporat ion, a 
Utah co rpora t ion ("Debtor") promises to pay to The Travel 
Company, I n c . , a Utah corpora t ion ("Payee") at 
or a t such other p lace 
as Payee s h a l l have des ignated to Debtor in wr i t i ng , the 
p r i n c i p a l sum of $500,000, toge the r with i n t e r e s t on the 
unpaid p r i n c i p a l balance c a l c u l a t e d at an annual r a t e 
equal to the l e s s e r of ten percent (10%) per annum or the 
"prime r a t e " per annum charged by F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank of 
Utah, N.A. ( the "Bank"), ad jus t ab l e the day of any change. 
("Prime r a t e " i s herein defined to be the lowest r a t e at 
which the Bank makes loans to i t s commercial borrowers . ) 
P r i n c i p a l i n s t a l lmen t s s h a l l be due and payable in accord-
ance with the following schedule : 
On Apri l 30 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On July 3 1 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $50 ,000; 
On October 3 1 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $50 ,000; 
On January 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $50 ,000; 
On Apri l 30 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On Ju ly 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On October 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On January 3 1 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On Apri l 30 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On July 3 1 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000 ; 
On October 3 1 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On January 3 1 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On Apri l 30 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000 ; 
On July 3 1 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On October 3 1 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On January 3 1 , 1990, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On Apri l 30 , 1990, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 
Accrued i n t e r e s t s h a l l be due and payable at the time of 
each p r i n c i p a l ins ta l lment payment descr ibed above. 
The principal amount of this Note, and the pay-
ment schedule set forth above, are subject to possible 
adjustment pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of that 
certain Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Assets (the 
"Agreement") dated as of April 15, 1985, between Debtor, 
Payee, and William and Wanda Hatton. If such an adjust-
ment is required, Debtor and Payee agree that Debtor shall 
execute an amendment to this Note reflecting the revised 
principal amount hereof and the revised payment schedule 
as provided for in the Agreement. 
In the event of any default in the payment of any 
principal or interest due under this Note when due and 
payable, and if such default is not cured within ten days 
after written notice thereof to Debtor from Payee, then 
the whole principal sum of this Note plus all accrued 
interest shall, at the option of the holder of this Note, 
become immediately due and payable without notice or 
demand, and the holder of this Note shall have and may 
exercise any and all of the rights and remedies provided 
herein. 
If Payee retains an attorney for collection of 
this Note, or if any suit or proceeding is brought for the 
recovery or protection of all or any part of the indebted-
ness evidenced by this Note, then Debtor agrees to pay on 
demand all costs and expenses of the suit or proceeding or 
any appeal thereof, incurred by Payee, including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Debtor shall have the right to prepay this Note 
in whole or in part at any time without penalty. 
Debtor hereby waives presentment and notice of 
dishonor, and assents to any extension of time with re-
spect to any payment due under this Note. No waiver of 
any payment or other right under this Note shall operate 
as a waiver of any other payment or right. 
This Note shall be governed by and construed 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
MORRIS TRAVEL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
By: 
President 
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Promissory Note 
April 30, 1985 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Mor r i s T rave l C o r p o r a t i o n , a 
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ( "Deb to r " ) p romises to pay to The Trave l 
Company, I n c . , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ("Payee'1) a t such p l a c e 
as Payee s h a l l have d e s i g n a t e d t o Debtor in w r i t i n g , t he 
p r i n c i p a l sum of $500 ,000 , t o g e t h e r wi th i n t e r e s t on t he 
unpa id p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e c a l c u l a t e d a t an annual r a t e 
e q u a l t o t h e l e s s e r of t en p e r c e n t (10%) per annum or t h e 
"pr ime r a t e " p e r annum charged by F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank of 
Utah , N.A. ( t h e " B a n k " ) , on t h e f i r s t day of each q u a r -
t e r l y p e r i o d d e s c r i b e d in t h e s c h e d u l e of payments below. 
("Pr ime r a t e " i s h e r e i n d e f i n e d t o be t h e lowest r a t e a t 
which t h e Bank makes l oans t o i t s commercial b o r r o w e r s . ) 
P r i n c i p a l i n s t a l l m e n t s s h a l l be due and payab le in 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e fo l l owing s c h e d u l e : 
On A p r i l 3 0 , 1986, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1986, Che p r i n c i p a l sum of $50 ,000; 
On O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $50,000; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $50,000; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1987, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1988, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1989, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On A p r i l 30 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1989, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000; 
On O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1989, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1990, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $25,000; 
On Apr i l 3 0 , 1990, t he p r i n c i p a l sum of $25 ,000 . 
Accrued interest shall be due and payable at the time of 
each principal installment payment described above. 
The principal amount of this Note, and the pay-
ment schedule set forth above, are subject to possible 
adjustment pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of that 
certain Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Assets (the 
"Agreement") dated as of April 15, 1985, between Debtor, 
Payee, and William and Wanda Hatton. If such an adjust-
ment is required, Debtor and Payee agree that Debtor 2nd 
Payee shall execute an amendment to this Note reflecting 
the revised principal amount hereof and the revised pay-
ment schedule as provided for in the Agreement. 
p 
In the event of any default in the payment of any 
principal or interest due under this Note when due and 
payable, and if such default is not cured within ten days 
after written notice thereof to Debtor from Payee, then 
the whole principal sum of this Note plus all accrued 
interest shall, at the option of the holder of this Note, 
become immediately due and payable without notice or 
demand, and the holder of this Note shall have and may 
exercise any and all of the rights and remedies provided 
herein. 
If Payee retains an attorney for collection of 
this Note, or if any suit or proceeding is brought for the 
recovery or protection of all or any part of the indebted-
ness evidenced by this Note, then Debtor agrees to pay on 
demand all costs and expenses of the suit or proceeding or 
any appeal thereof, incurred by Payee, including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
Debtor shall have the right to prepay this Note 
in whole or in part at any time without penalty. 
The payment of this Note is guaranteed, in part, 
under Guaranty Agreements of even date herewith executed 
by Randall A. Hunt, Mark G. Slack, Richard W. Frendt and 
Kaye H. Burgon. 
Debtor hereby waives presentment and notice of 
dishonor,, and assents to any extension of time with re-
spect to any payment due under this Note. Nonwaiver of 
any payment or other right under this Note shall operate 
as a waiver of any other payment or right. 
This Note shall be governed by and construed 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
MORRIS TRAVEL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
By: v ^ % ^ ^> c ^ ^ ^ ^ -
President 
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